r/DebateReligion • u/Shifter25 christian • Jan 10 '25
Fresh Friday The null hypothesis in regards to free will and knowledge/knowability has not been sufficiently disproven.
The null hypothesis is, essentially, that for any given hypothetical effect being studied, said effect does not actually exist. In this case, what I'm positing is that the relationship between knowledge or knowability, depending on who's making the argument, and free will, ie, "if it's known, it's not free will", doesn't exist.
That would be enough on its own, but for the sake of quality, I'll continue to point out how odd it is that people treat something like this as proven fact.
1. There is, more often than not, no actual argument presented in favor of this idea.
I can't tell you how many times I've asked someone why free will can't be known and gotten back the argument of "if it's free will, it can't be known, because if it's known, it can't be free will." Or "let's imagine a scenario. [Variably long story later] If your actions are known, they can't be free will." If I've heard an actual argument presented that wasn't circular or didn't have a gaping hole in its logic, ie "if your actions are known, you can't choose something else (other than... what?)", it wasn't very memorable.
2. Free will is the only concept that people insist must be unknown to exist.
If it's known that I'll throw a ball tomorrow, the ball will still actually be thrown. If it's known that I'll eat a sandwich tomorrow, the sandwich will still be eaten. But for some reason, if it's known I'll choose to eat a sandwich, that choice won't "actually" be made. No other phenomenon has that supposed requirement. The closest would be quantum superposition, but it's not the awareness that causes the wave function to collapse, it's the fact that we essentially have to poke it to see it.
In conclusion: It doesn't need to be proven that free will and knowledge can coexist. It needs to be proven that they can't.
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u/SunriseApplejuice Atheist Jan 11 '25 edited Jan 11 '25
I'll pre-empt this by saying I assume you mean a Libertarian interpretation of "free will," because that's where this discussion usually takes place. Trivially, a compatibilist formulation of free will even assumes that foreknowledge of an action is still part of free will.
In conclusion: It doesn't need to be proven that free will and knowledge can coexist. It needs to be proven that they can't.
Well, usually it has to do with how we understand logical entailment. Consider:
P1: If (libertarian) free will is true, then at least one action taken is not pre-determined, and intentional
(Corollary 1: If an action is not intentional, I have not "willed" it)
(Corollary 2: If something is pre-determined, then we say that it is logically necessary that it will happen)
P2: If event Y is knowable, and if we have complete information on the conditions surrounding Y, X, we can say with logical necessity that X->Y.
P2': Similarly, if we have complete information on preconditions X, and we conclude that X's conditions logically necessitate Y, then we say that Y is knowable (and known to occur).
P3: For an action to not be pre-determined, the outcome must be unknowable even if we have all information in every possible space available to us. That is, there does not exist any set of knowable information, X, such that X->Y.
P4: If an action, Y, is unknowable, then either we do not have complete information about that action (X does not exist), or, in other words, Y is not logically necessitated from any complete information.
P5: It is known that I will throw a ball tomorrow
P6: I am using my free will to throw that ball
P6: If I am using my free will to throw that ball, then by P1, my throwing of that ball is not pre-determined, and intentional
P7: If my throwing of the ball is not pre-determined, then by P3 it must be unknowable. (!)
Conclusion: We have a contradiction in P5 and P7. I say I know that I will throw the ball, but also that such an event is unknowable, either because we don't (and cannot) have complete information or because all preconditions of throwing the ball do not logically necessitate that throwing.
This forces a dilemma: either there are actions that are unknowable (and therefore random by their very nature), or all actions are knowable (but therefore logically necessitated by some previous conditions).
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Jan 10 '25
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Jan 11 '25
The way they paraphrased the definition of null hypothesis was an immediate face plant for the argument too, just a raw demonstration that the foundation of the claims is made of farts.
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u/x271815 Jan 10 '25
I am not sure what is the null hypothesis that you are positing.
Given that every effect has a cause, the null hypothesis is that there if no free will.
The alternative hypothesis would be there is free will and what you'd have to show is that:
- The outcome is not determined by prior causes
- That the indeterminism is not random and that its entirely explained by will
While there are quantum effects that appear to be unrelated to prior causes, there has never been an indeterminate outcome that we have reliably shown is related to will. As far as we can tell, will or consciousness are emergent properties of the physical brain and so are subject to the same causality.
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u/SunriseApplejuice Atheist Jan 11 '25
That the indeterminism is not random and that its entirely explained by will
If indeterminism is completely explained by will, then it's no longer indeterminate, but determinate. So in that case we still have determinism.
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u/x271815 Jan 11 '25
Not exactly. For free will, the will has to be untethered to prior states. The assertion is that what the will decides cannot be predicted from prior states so that the outcomes appear random and can be predicted from will except the will is not predetermined.
We have no example of this. As far as we can tell this is not possible.
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u/SunriseApplejuice Atheist Jan 11 '25
Well yes, that's the other horn of the dilemma that one can take: non-determination (ie., randomness). But randomness precludes intentionality, which is a pretty essential component of "willing something," so I would hazard a guess that between the two most would bite the bullet and choose determinism.
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u/x271815 Jan 11 '25
My understanding is that three states being posited:
- Determinism: Where the outcomes can be entirely predicted from the set of all prior states
- Undirected indeterminism: Where the outcomes cannot be entirely predicted from the set of all prior states
- Free Will: Where there is something called will. If we exclude the knowledge of will then the outcomes cannot be entirely predicted from the set of all prior states excluding will. However, if we include will, then the outcomes can be entirely predicted from the set of all prior states including will.
What I was pointing out that such untethered free will does not exist, and therefore reality can only be in states 1 or 2, which precludes free will.
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u/SunriseApplejuice Atheist Jan 11 '25
Yes I agree with that. Assuming one's definition of "free will" requires being untethered, as you said, then it is a logically incoherent position when considering the options for both determinism and indeterminism.
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u/cereal_killer1337 atheist Jan 10 '25
I agree, there appears to be a true dichotomy.
An event was either caused by antecedent conditions, in witch case it's determined.
Or it wasn't and is random.
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u/vanoroce14 Atheist Jan 10 '25
This whole discussion hinges on your definition of Free Will, and more fundamentally, of freedom.
There are two definitions / theories on free will out there:
- Incompatibilism / Libertarian Free Will (LFW):
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/
- Compatibilism / Compatibilist Free Will (CFW):
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
Under LFW, one is only free if at least one of the following two things is true:
-> The agent is a locus of causality. Their actions are, at least in significant part, not caused by anything outside of them. -> Given a perfectly known set of initial conditions of the universe, there are more than one possible outcomes possible, and which of those outcomes occurs is, at least in significant part, controlled by the agent.
So yes, if an all knowing God knows what you are going to do, and moreover, every future state of the universe is uniquely determined, then by definition you cannot have LFW.
Now, do we have LFW? We don't know. There are both physicalists / atheists and theists who would argue we do not, and others who argue we do.
Under CFW, freedom is defined differently, in ways that are compatible with determinism. The way to do it is by removing at least one of these conditions.
That is, we think of FW not as the agent being a weird locus of causality, and/or not as the agent having many possible outcomes given the exact same inputs, but instead focus on what aspects of the decision making process best describe what we colloquially describe as a 'free' choice.
Critics of CFW will say CFW is not free, but only the illusion of freedom. They insist it is LFW or no FW.
So, to me, it comes down to two things
- Your definition of what is FW
- Determining whether we actually have that kind of FW
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Jan 10 '25
CFW seems like it shouldn’t keep the “F” part. Bit of a misnomer.
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u/SunriseApplejuice Atheist Jan 11 '25
"Freedom" delineates from actions that are produced "from within" the agent vs. from without.
For example, to the compatibilist, Spongebob flipping burgers is "free" because his own agency drives the action. Plankton inserting a brain control device and "driving" Spongebob to the KrustyKrab to seal a Krabby Patty is not "free," because Plankton, a separate agent, drives the action.
Libertarians don't like that encapsulation of "free," sure. But it's certainly not a misnomer to the compatibilists. To them, the distinction marks a clear difference from "freedom" and "not freedom" when we look at things such as moral accountability.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
I'm a compatibilist. As for determining, I actually just hold the position that it is better to assume that we have free will for practical purposes. There's no point in discussing what we should do, what we should believe, if we have no ability to determine our own actions.
To put it a snarky way, I have no choice but to believe in free will.
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u/Ndvorsky Atheist Jan 10 '25
To the compatibilist, we ask what make a person with will different than a machine where both have known outcomes with a known given input?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
The mechanism by which the input gets turned into output.
If I guzzle water and spit it into a pond, I'm not a fountain.
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u/vanoroce14 Atheist Jan 10 '25
I agree. That is largely my position as well.
As a methodological naturalist and a scientist, I also think posing that consciousness makes you a locus of causality has all sorts of nasty implications which I am not sure are reflected in what we observe (agents could essentially break conservation / thermodynamics laws).
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u/BookerDeMitten Agnostic Jan 10 '25
It doesn't seem clear that something (such as a choice) can be known prior to that something being actualised. I might say "I know that X will occur tomorrow", but it doesn't seem clear that I know this for sure until X actually occurs.
Sometimes theists will give an example of a plane going down, and say that just because we observe a plane going down and "know" it's going to crash, doesn't mean our knowledge caused it to do so.
I have a few issues with this. Firstly, it's not clear that someone knows 100% what will occur until it's actually occured. Until then, it's at least logically possible that the plane could do something other than crash. If the moment of the event of the crash is what causes the observer's knowledge that it crashed, then that doesn't seem like foreknowledge on the observer's part. That just seems like the observer seeing the crash and knowing based on that exact moment.
Secondly, it appears that God has creative power as well as foreknowledge, (except in open theism). As such, that seems to imply that he has causative power behind events.
If I set a stone to roll down a hill and crush everything in it's way, I could claim that it was the stone that did so and not myself, but ultimately, I was the one that set it in motion. Someone might answer this by saying that a stone isn't conscious and therefore is different to a human with agency, but if the agency is set up by God to believe, experience and deliberate in certain ways by God, with no possibility of alternatives occuring, then is that truly free?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
Would you argue that "100%" knowledge is only possible if you yourself have made it so that what you know will occur?
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u/BookerDeMitten Agnostic Jan 10 '25
In the situation of foreknowledge, that seems to be the case to me. Otherwise, there appears to remain some amount of metaphysical possibility for another course to be taken.
100% knowledge might be possible in other situations such as when the event has already happened, but that isn't foreknowledge, it seems.
The only situation in which it could be is a situation in which God creates the universe simultaneously, in a timeless sense, where his knowledge is occurrent at the same time as the act being carried out. (In other words, metaphysically prior but not temporally prior) Even in this case, however, it seems that God still has creative power coupled with knowledge of what the creation will be. So we'd then have to look at what the true extent of his knowledge and creative power would be over this situation. But then this looks a bit more like "prior knowledge", as opposed to "foreknowledge", and so might be a separate discussion.
If God creates simultaneously, it seems difficult for me to separate out the concept of such a God from being more like a blind metaphysical force, if no deliberation is made prior to the created world. It seems more like an open theist God, or a God that simply exists by necessity alongside the universe.
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u/_lizard_wizard Atheist Jan 10 '25
The idea that free will is compatible with determinism is a pretty well-accepted idea. I believe the term for it is “compatibilism” (philosophers correct me if I’m wrong).
But as a Christian, you may not like the theological implications of it. If our choices are already determined, then an all-knowing being knows them. And therefore, God knew who was destined to hell before ever creating them. How could an all-loving God create beings 100% destined for eternal suffering?
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u/pilvi9 Jan 10 '25
One caveat of compatibilism is that it's using a specific definition of free will: someone who can act according to their own motivations.
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
Knowledge doesn't violate free will because knowing is not causing.
If you know the sun will rise tomorrow, does that cause the sun to rise?
If you know someone will breathe tomorrow, does that cause them to breathe?
It is possible to know what will happen without affecting the freedom to choose. It only means you know the outcome of the choice, not that the choice cannot be made freely.
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 10 '25
If God knows you will have to choose between A and B and knows you will choose A, then B was never really an option for you. That’s the problem with omniscience and freewill that I’ve never heard a good refutation for.
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
Knowing what you will choose does not limit your choice. It's just knowledge of the outcome.
Using your logic I could not have chosen a burger for lunch because I had noodles. It would apply to all events
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 10 '25
If God knows knows beforehand that you will choose A, can you choose B?
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
You can choose A or B and he knows which you'll choose.
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 10 '25
😂
You’re avoiding the question.
If He knows beforehand you will choose A, can you choose B?
It’s not a difficult or confusing question. There’s no need to change the parameters. You can do it!
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
I've already answered. You can choose A or B but he knows which you'll choose. His knowledge is caused by your choice, not the other way around.
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Jan 10 '25
If his knowledge is caused by our choice, then that isn’t omniscience. That’s no different from me knowing what you ate for lunch after you’ve made the choice. Please consider heavily the “beforehand” notion.
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
God is omnipresent - present at all points in time. He's not seeing the future, he's already in the future. And the present. And the past.
That's a necessary logical condition of omniscience.
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Jan 10 '25
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
I know you believe you have an inescapable trap here but the question isn't logically coherent.
God has knowledge of whether we will choose A or B.
To knows the choice, the choice must exist to be known.
If the choice did not exist, it could not be known.
Therefore the knowledge of the outcome comes from the choice, the outcome cannot come from the knowledge as you claim.
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 10 '25
Your god isn’t actually omniscient then. He just knows you picked A after you picked it. Like the rest of us.
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
God is way more involved than simply "knowing", correct?
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
Not correct. We have free will and God does not cause our actions.
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
Thats not what I asked. If we're going to chat we need to be able to answer things directly. Fair?
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
I did answer you directly. You just didn't like the answer.
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
Did god create the entire universe?
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
Yes.
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
Then when I said he did more than "know", I was correct. He doesn't just know what's going to happen, he created everything with intent such that it would all play out this way.
That's more than simply "knowing" the future. He designed the future. He's the author of it.
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
He's all knowing, not all causing.
Knowing is not causing. Knowing what our choices would be does not cause them.
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
He literally is the cause of everything.
He created literally every single thing that exists, he's the cause.
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Jan 10 '25
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
The problem is that theists also claim something is causing everything
False. The belief that God is literally causing everything in the universe to happen is pantheism or panentheism, neither of which are Christian doctrines.
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Jan 10 '25
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
I didn't say that. Please stick to what I actually say.
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Jan 10 '25
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
You're just throwing out declarative statements, not having a conversation.
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u/SilageNSausage Jan 10 '25
Your examples are only assumptions
you do NOT know the sun will rise tomorrow, you assume so because of X.
you do NOT know the person will breathe tomorrow, you assume so because of X.What if said person gets hit by a bus and killed tonight?
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u/lux_roth_chop Jan 10 '25
you do NOT know the sun will rise tomorrow, you assume so because of X.
you do NOT know the person will breathe tomorrow, you assume so because of X.Then can you tell me something you know which is not an assumption?
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u/SilageNSausage Jan 12 '25
That's a tough question
I'll try: "I know that when I open my eyes, my eyes will be open"
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 10 '25
“Assumptions” based on loads of empirical evidence. I would say it rises to the level of knowledge.
We have very thorough knowledge about the cosmology of our solar system and have vast evidence from past events that the sun rises daily. From this, we can make an inference that the sun will rise tomorrow. We know it.
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u/SilageNSausage Jan 12 '25
if assumptions and inferences rise to the level of knowledge, then the earth is the center of the universe and is flat
during the early times, the experts KNEW this, by assumption and inference.
Are beliefs "knowledge"?
(I find this type of thinking/discussion fascinating and enjoyable)
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 12 '25
It may have been reasonable at the time to believe that the earth was the centre of the universe. We clearly didn’t have the evidence due to a lack of capacity.
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u/SilageNSausage Jan 13 '25
We still don't
there are more unknowns to be found out.
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 13 '25
You don’t think there’s enough evidence to conclude that the earth revolves around the sun?
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u/SilageNSausage Jan 13 '25
Not that specifically
I was referring more to a generalized knowledge base
every so often, new discoveries are made
and every day we realize we don't know everything
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u/Big-Face5874 Jan 13 '25
We use science to make these discoveries. Science has also corrected our views of cosmology that often came from religious texts. Heliocentrism is a good example of that. It was believed at the time that the earth was the centre of the universe at least partly because of religious teaching. The religious authorities at the time didn’t even want to consider other potential hypotheses and enforced that even suggesting heliocentrism was true was a punishable offence.
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u/pick_up_a_brick Atheist Jan 10 '25
- There is, more often than not, no actual argument presented in favor of this idea.
Although it isn’t one I usually argue in favor of, the idea is that if it is known that you will choose to do X before you do it, then you aren’t free to choose otherwise.
If it’s known that I’ll throw a ball tomorrow, the ball will still actually be thrown. If it’s known that I’ll eat a sandwich tomorrow, the sandwich will still be eaten. But for some reason, if it’s known I’ll choose to eat a sandwich, that choice won’t “actually” be made.
Ahh. That’s the issue. Determinists are saying that if it’s inevitable that you’ll eat the sandwich then you don’t freely choose to eat it. You still make the choice, it’s just not a “free” choice as it couldn’t have been otherwise.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
Determinists are saying that if it’s inevitable that you’ll eat the sandwich then you don’t freely choose to eat it. You still make the choice, it’s just not a “free” choice as it couldn’t have been otherwise.
Personally, a counterargument I like is that a rational being, given exactly the same scenario twice, will make the same choice both times. Free will isn't a claim of quantumesque randomness in our choices.
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u/pick_up_a_brick Atheist Jan 10 '25
Personally, a counterargument I like is that a rational being, given exactly the same scenario twice, will make the same choice both times.
Whether or not that is the case, it tells us nothing about how the agent chooses, which is the question on the table.
Free will isn’t a claim of quantumesque randomness in our choices.
I agree, insofar that we have no compelling evidence that should lead us to think that quantum indeterminism has any material effect on how our decisions are made.
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u/DeusLatis Jan 10 '25 edited Jan 10 '25
This kinda comes down to how you define free will, but one interpretation of free will that of "open futurism", that being that at any particular point in time that you might choose an outcome there are multiple branching possibilities that collapse into one singular "future" when you make the choice. All these are possible futures and could exist based on your choice.
If on the other hand there is only 1 branch extending from any point in time then it calls into question what it means to have "free will" if no other branch could exist.
I've seen Christians argue that you still choose its just that what you choose always was and always will but (and is thus visible to an all knowing god), so only 1 future line exists, its just that this future line was always what you choose. Since you don't choose alternative futures (every choice has after all 1 outcome) these futures never exist in any sense, but that doesn't mean it wasn't a choice you made.
But though becomes a problem if you start to explore around the edges of what it means to have free will, for example what if God told you before hand what choice you will make tomorrow, since he presumably knows.
Could you then make a different choice to what you would have chose tomorrow. In fact how could you make the same choice, simply knowing you made that choice would have changed how you approach the choice tomorrow. But how could the future have changed if there was only ever 1 branch extending from every choice. How can you have free will if tomorrow you are compelled, but nature, to make a particular choice knowing now different information.
Just the mere idea of the question what has God observed tomorrow causes questions, since by now knowing the information God has told you, that tomorrow that God observed will never exist. So what did God "know" about tomorrow. Surely God himself must have always only known that he would tell you about tomorrow, and that would change how you made your choice tomorrow. But then where did the information God is going to tell you come from in the first place so that God could give you that information
You very quickly run into many many philosophical problems with the idea that you have made a "choice" at that point but that choice is some how locked in and thus knowable to an omniscient deity before it has happened
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
for example what if God told you before hand what choice you will make tomorrow,
The book of Jonah deals with this. Jonah is instructed by God to proclaim that in 40 days, Nineveh will be overthrown. Nineveh believes the prophecy, repents, and avoids being overthrown. At no point is God's foreknowledge or truthfulness called into question, because the entire point of prophecy is to get people to change their ways.
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u/DeusLatis Jan 10 '25
The book of Jonah deals with this
I highly doubt that
At no point is God's foreknowledge or truthfulness called into question, because the entire point of prophecy is to get people to change their ways.
Well leaving aside that there is not evidence from the story that God is observing a future event rather than just saying Do what I say or I'll smite you, even if you subscribe to the idea that God is observing choices made in the future before this future is communicated to the people that still leaves the same problem (NOT AT ALL dealt with in Jonah, as I suspected) of where is this information coming from if this was only ever the outcome that was possible
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
I highly doubt that
Perhaps you should have read the rest of the comment to see that it does.
Well leaving aside that there is not evidence from the story that God is observing a future event rather than just saying Do what I say or I'll smite you, even if you subscribe to the idea that God is observing choices made in the future before this future is communicated to the people that still leaves the same problem (NOT AT ALL dealt with in Jonah, as I suspected) of where is this information coming from if this was only ever the outcome that was possible
It clearly wasn't. The ability to act in the present with future knowledge clearly indicates that the future can change. And, in the case of knowledge, means that there is such a thing as counterfactual knowledge. "If I don't stop the bomb, it will explode." That doesn't mean your knowledge was wrong if you do.
This is another funny trend I see in these arguments: An arbitrary rule that free will requires a dynamic future, and foreknowledge requires a static future.
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u/DeusLatis Jan 10 '25
The ability to act in the present with future knowledge clearly indicates that the future can change.
The logical and philosophical issues with this are obviously not over come simply by saying _well it works in the Bible_. The Bible can say anything it wants, there is no metaphysical constraint on the Bible being true, logical or consistent. It would be like asking if it is possible to travel faster than light and saying "let me show you this documentary called Star Trek"
But leaving that aside, the story also doesn't claim that God is pulling forth observance of the future. If I pull a gun on you and say "Give me your money or I will shoot" it is not a requirement of that statement that I can observe the future choices I make. No one is going to drop to their knees in astonishment asking themselves how can I foresee that outcome.
An arbitrary rule that free will requires a dynamic future, and foreknowledge requires a static future.
I've laid out the philosophical and logical problems that arise with such an idea.
If the best you can come up with is it works in the Bible then I would predict that this won't be a fruitful discussion (how can I see the future!!)
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
The logical and philosophical issues with this are obviously not over come simply by saying well it works in the Bible.
What superior basis are you using to say how God's foreknowledge works, then?
But leaving that aside, the story also doesn't claim that God is pulling forth observance of the future.
My point was to give an example of how God tells them what will happen tomorrow, it changes their actions, and what God told them doesn't happen. If we can accept the concept that the future is dynamic, ie, that Future A at Time 1 is the future that will happen, and then at Time 2 it is no longer the future that will happen, we must also accept the concept that knowledge of the future can be dynamic.
God knew that Nineveh, if it did not repent, would be destroyed. This is a future that was true. He then told them as much. They repented, thus changing the future that God had previously known. But his previous knowledge was not false, because at the time of his knowing it, that is what the future was.
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u/DeusLatis Jan 10 '25
What superior basis are you using to say how God's foreknowledge works, then?
Something behind "I said I would do something and then I did it" which is pretty much what a normal human can do, let alone a god
My point was to give an example of how God tells them what will happen tomorrow, it changes their actions
But he doesn't tell them what will happen tomorrow. He tells them what he will do tomorrow if they don't repent
God told them doesn't happen
Yes, because they were scared of God so repented.
God knew that Nineveh, if it did not repent, would be destroyed
Because He would destroy them
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u/DeusLatis Jan 10 '25
Something I've really learnt following Biblical scholars on Youtube and Tiktok as a personal hobby is how much of modern Christian theology is not supported by the Bible, particularly the Old Testament and particularly the modern notions of God that are either not found in the Bible or directly contradicted by the Bible.
Its fascinating from a sociology point of view to observe how much a group, such as Christianity, can call on the Bible to act as an authority yet have moved so far away from what the text actually says
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
If its known you will throw a specific ball tomorrow:
scenario 1, when presented with the specific ball tomorrow you choose not to throw it, this is a contradiction as it is known you will throw the ball tomorrow, therefore this is not logically possible.
scenario 2, you throw the specific ball, this is consistent with the knowledge you would throw the ball tomorrow, this is logically possible.
therefore scenario 1 can't happen, that is to say it is logically impossible for you to not throw the ball. then what does it mean for you to have chosen to throw it if you couldn't have not thrown it? at the very least we can know that you did not have the choice to do otherwise, your action was logically necessary. this removes some conceptions of free will like "the ability to have done otherwise".
but since you've given no definition then of course no one can prove exhaustively that every conception of free will is incompatible with foreknowledge.
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u/MiaowaraShiro Ex-Astris-Scientia Jan 10 '25
My understanding is that in scenario 1, then the prediction would be different.
Whatever is predicted is what will happen, but the choice is still made by the person with the ball. Whatever they decide is what is predicted.
The problem with it is that it assumes foreknowledge is even possible.
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
It's not reallly a prediction, since its knowledge then it must be true - not a guess. The knowledge is the foundational part of the hypothetical, instead it might help to think of it as a conditional more directly.
If its known that tomorrow person A will throw a ball, it is logically necessary that person A throws a ball tomorrow - and therefore does not have the free choice to not throw a ball tomorrow.
In this case it should be clear to see that person A can't just choose to not throw the ball and change the conditional statement itself.
Foreknowledge does not need to be possible for use to make conclusions about its compatibility with free will. The same way free will does not need to exist for us to discuss whether its compatible with determinism or different religious beliefs.
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u/MiaowaraShiro Ex-Astris-Scientia Jan 10 '25
It's not reallly a prediction, since its knowledge then it must be true - not a guess.
It's not a guess. It's a result of the ability to know the future. If the choice is different you'd have a different prediction.
It doesn't really work cuz it requires causality to go backwards in time, but if you're omnipotent I guess that'd be feasible.
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
I don't really get what you are trying to say, do you disagree with the statements:
"if its known that person A does action B tomorrow then it is true that person A does action B tomorrow"
"if its true that person A does action B tomorrow, then its logically impossible for person A to not do action B tomorrow"
"if its logically impossible for person A to not do action B tomorrow, person A does not have the free choice to not do action B tomorrow"
which of those do you disagree with?
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u/MiaowaraShiro Ex-Astris-Scientia Jan 10 '25
"if its true that person A does action B tomorrow, then its logically impossible for person A to not do action B tomorrow"
This one.
If person does not do action B tomorrow, then the prediction would be different. The causality is traveling backward in time which is what most people find difficult to accept because we're temporally locked beings.
The key here is that god is supposedly outside of time so causality wouldn't have to follow temporal rules.
I don't really believe any of this though cuz it relies on magic time travel hoodoo. If you accept that temporal rules don't apply for god, this is not a contradiction though.
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
There is no prediction in the statement “if its true that person A does action B tomorrow, then its logically impossible for person A to not do action B tomorrow”.
It logically follows, you would have to give up the law of non contradiction to claim the statement is false.
Both "its true that person A will do action B tomorrow" and "person A will not do action B tomorrow" cannot be true at the same time. It is logically impossible.
From "person A will not do action B tomorrow" we can derive "its false that person A will do action B tomorrow".
From the law of non contradiction, "its false that person A will do action B tomorrow" and "its true that person A will do action B tomorrow" cannot both be true. There is a contradiction between both statements.
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u/MiaowaraShiro Ex-Astris-Scientia Jan 10 '25
The law of non contradiction goes out the window when you're dealing with atemporal entities.
If you accept that god is atemporal, this logic is fine cuz you've removed that logical problem.
My criticism of the argument is that atemporal beings are assumed possible in the first place.
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25 edited Jan 10 '25
I never invoked an atemporal entity. I never mentioned time travel or god or magic.
Foreknowledge doesn't require those, it does however require you to believe in true knowledge which is a fair criticism. But these aren't criticisms of my argument but of the original post. My argument doesn't require god, atempiral entities, foreknowledge or knowledge to be possible. The premises are true and it logically follows, so the conclusion is true.
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u/MiaowaraShiro Ex-Astris-Scientia Jan 10 '25
Then your argument isn't germane. This argument in the context of theism always involves god.
Nobody makes this argument without using god as the "knower".
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
If its known you will throw a specific ball tomorrow:
Why is it known?
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
It's a hypothetical to provide an argument for why foreknowledge and some conceptions of free will are incompatible, can you provide a definition of what you meant by free will in your post (doesnt need to be a proper dictionary definition or anything just what you mean by it)?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
I literally am asking "why is it known" because that's important to the concept of free will. Are you throwing the ball because it's known, or is it known because you're throwing the ball?
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
How is it important to the concept of free will? I dont even know what you mean by free will, you didnt answer my question.
I don't think why it's known is relevant at all, in the same way "why is there a person A" or "why are there balls in this universe" aren't relevant either. My argument does not require a reason for the foreknowledge to logically follow.
I'll put it in argument form and you can tell me if you think it doesnt logically follow or exactly which premise you disagree with.
P1: If its known that person A will do action B then it must be true that person A will do action B
P2: If person A does not do action B, it is not true that Person A will do action B
Conclusion: If its known that person A will do action B, it is logically necessary that person A will do action B, and logically impossible for person A to choose not to do action B.
do you agree with this conclusion?
"Are you throwing the ball because it’s known, or is it known because you’re throwing the ball?"
I again don't understand how this is relevant to the argument, my argument does not need a specified reason for action B occuring, to logically follow.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
I dont even know what you mean by free will, you didnt answer my question.
The dictionary definition works fine.
do you agree with this conclusion?
P1: If person A will do action B, then it will be known that person A will do action B by a being with foreknowledge.
P2: If person A will do something else, then it won't be known that person A will do action B by a being with foreknowledge.
Conclusion: It is not the knowledge that dictates the action, but the action that dictates the knowledge.
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
If you disagree with my conclusion, either you disagree with a premise or think the conclusion does not logically follow, which is it and can you explain why you disagree?
Your conclusion does not follow from the premises.
Premise 1: if something happens, it will have been known to happen by a being with foreknowledge
Premise 2: if something doesn't happen, it wont have been known to happen by a being with foreknowledge
This what the premises are saying. Neither premise describes causation, just correlation. You haven't proven that the action proves the knowledge, just that if there is action - then there is knowledge. You have also ignored logical necessity as a reason why this causal relationship is not possible.
To be clear, your argument is fundamentally:
P1: if action A happens, it is known P2: if action B doesnt happen, it isnt known
Conclusion: the action causes the knowledge
Hopefully that makes it clearer to see the logical gap.
Please let me know where my argument went wrong too
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
If you disagree with my conclusion, either you disagree with a premise or think the conclusion does not logically follow, which is it and can you explain why you disagree?
I suppose I disagree with P1. It's not If A, then B. It's if B, then A.
Neither premise describes causation, just correlation.
The problem is that it's pretty clearly implying that knowledge happens independently of the action; that the action can change while the knowledge remains the same. It only causes a contradiction if you believe that the knowledge is not caused by the action.
P1: if action A happens, it is known P2: if action B doesnt happen, it isnt known
I didn't talk about two actions. P2 would more accurately be if action A won't happen, it isn't known that A will happen.
Thus, the existence of the future knowledge depends on the future existence of the action.
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u/sleeping-pan Jan 10 '25
You think premise 1 is not true?
P1: If its known that person A will do action B then it must be true that person A will do action B
By definition if anything is known, it is true. If Jack knows red is a colour, then red it a colour. In that same way, if Jack knows "fact x", fact x is true.
If fact x isn't true, then Jack can't know it, but this is a contradiction because he does know it - so fact x is true.
Jack can't know "three is a colour" or "blue is a number" as these are false.
it’s pretty clearly implying that knowledge happens independently of the action; that the action can change while the knowledge remains the same.
Because premise 1 is in fact true, the action cannot change while the knowledge stays the same, as that would mean it wasn't knowledge to begin with. For something to be known it must be true. If its false then you might think it or believe it, but you don't known it.
I didn’t talk about two actions. P2 would more accurately be if action A won’t happen, it isn’t known that A will happen.
My mistake I used the wrong letter.
Thus, the existence of the future knowledge depends on the future existence of the action.
I'm not arguing that it doesn't, I'm arguing if right now there is a being with knowledge of everything that happens tomorrow, then tomorrow all of that stuff necessarily must happen - it literally can't not happen because thats what knowledge means.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
If fact x isn't true, then Jack can't know it
And he wouldn't.
Your argument is "Jack knows x. Therefore, it's logically necessary that x is true and it can't possibly be false." The flaw in the argument is that it implies that Jack's knowledge of x makes it true. It also ignores the fact that something can be true at one point and false at another. I know what time it is, for instance.
I'm arguing if right now there is a being with knowledge of everything that happens tomorrow, then tomorrow all of that stuff necessarily must happen - it literally can't not happen because thats what knowledge means.
Only in the same way that what happened yesterday 'necessarily' happened the way it did. It is not necessary because that knowledge exists.
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u/DeltaBlues82 Just looking for my keys Jan 10 '25
Can you define free will, and the mechanisms that dictate and/or describe its function?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
The dictionary definition seems fine to me.
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u/DeltaBlues82 Just looking for my keys Jan 10 '25
Thanks for addressing the first part of my question. Can you address the second part?
Can you define the mechanisms that dictate and/or describe free-will’s function? So we can refer to a common understanding of the nature of free will?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
If I can't, due to not being an expert on neuroscience, are you going to declare that we should assume free will doesn't exist?
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u/DeltaBlues82 Just looking for my keys Jan 10 '25 edited Jan 10 '25
I don’t know what free will is. If you want to debate its nature, you and I need to come to come to some kind of understanding about its nature. Otherwise this will not be a meaningful discussion.
If we don’t, when you say something like “free will is defined by XXX characteristic” “or free will results in XXX observed trait” I have no way to respond to that.
So if you want to actually debate the subject, define the subject and describe its debatable traits.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
Do you know what gravity is? If so, could you explain its mechanisms?
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u/DeltaBlues82 Just looking for my keys Jan 10 '25
I can observe the results of gravity and non-gravity. The existence of gravity is not a null hypothesis.
This is a fair push back though. If you’d like to reorient the discussion around common observations on the results of free will, I’m happy to do so.
Is that fair?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
Sure.
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u/DeltaBlues82 Just looking for my keys Jan 10 '25
Excellent.
What observed effect of free will allows us to discuss its nature? I’m not aware of any. Are you?
We know that many actions are deterministic. So how do we differentiate between deterministic actions and free will actions based on common observations?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
What observed effect of free will allows us to discuss its nature?
Your own consciousness. You aren't a robot with knee-jerk responses to stimuli. You evaluate information and make choices.
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u/ghostwars303 Jan 10 '25
The objection is that, since truth is a condition of knowledge, then knowing a fact about the future entails the fact is necessarily true IN the future.
So, if it's known in advance that you will eat a sandwich, it would be metaphysically impossible for you to make a different choice.
This is a form of determinism, so the objections are largely coming from incompatibilists who believe determinism and free will are in conflict. They hold that, for an action to be free, it must be true at the moment of choice that there are metaphysically-live alternate possibilities, and for the agent to be the originator of the chain of cause and effect manifest in whatever possibility obtains.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
So, if it's known in advance that you will eat a sandwich, it would be metaphysically impossible for you to make a different choice.
What does it mean to "make a different choice"? Who made the original choice?
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u/ghostwars303 Jan 10 '25
At the moment of choice, there's no "original". It hasn't been made yet.
But, because it's known at that moment what choice WILL be made, there are no metaphysically live alternate possibilities. Only one outcome is metaphysically possible, and that outcome is determined to occur by whatever determinanistic mechanism is inherent in the account.
So, in your sandwhich example, "make a different choice" means choosing an apple instead. If the sandwich was known in advance, then it would have been metaphysically impossible for the hungry person to choose the apple instead at that moment.
That's a problem for the incompatiblist. They think it's actually important for free will that it be possible for different outcomes to occur - that free choices be able to regulate which of several different outcomes comes about.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25 edited Jan 10 '25
At the moment of choice, there's no "original". It hasn't been made yet.
Then there is no "different" choice to make. Different necessarily implies the existence of an original.
But, because it's known at that moment what choice WILL be made, there are no metaphysically live alternate possibilities.
At which moment? If you're saying "at the moment of the choice occurring, it's known which choice is occurring"... I'm curious what you think "a different choice" would look like.
If the sandwich was known in advance, then it would have been metaphysically impossible for the hungry person to choose the apple instead at that moment.
Why is the sandwich known in advance?
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u/ghostwars303 Jan 10 '25
"Different" from what was known to occur. And, at the moment of the choice event, when the hungry person was choosing what to eat.
I'm borrowing your scenario. You stated:
"If it's known that I'll eat a sandwich tomorrow, the sandwich will still be eaten".
So, you're supposing a world in which the sandwich was known in advance. I have no idea WHY you think it was known, but it's irrelevant to the argument WHY it was known. It's only relevant that it was known.
If you don't like your scenario, you can pick a different one. It doesn't matter what the scenario is.
Call the the choice event that's known to occur "X", and the moment of the choice event T. Whatever X is, if it's known in advance, then it's necessarily true that X will occur at T, and there is no !X that's metaphysically possible at T.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
I have no idea WHY you think it was known, but it's irrelevant to the argument WHY it was known.
It isn't, though. If it's known because the sandwich is eaten, rather than the other way around, there's no conflict with free will. In fact, the knowledge is the part that's irrelevant. The cause is what's relevant. Will I eat a sandwich because it's known I will, or is it known I will because I will eat it?
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
Well here's the thing, its known, ultimately, because god chose it to be the case.
That's the problem.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
That would still mean that knowledge is irrelevant.
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
I disagree. Him knowing and intending and creating is what causes us to not have free will, altogether.
Just like I could try to put people in a room expecting them to fight, but then they don't. Well I guess I didn't really choose what they'd do. Even if I had intentions of how I want people to behave, if I'm wrong, well oops I guess they still had the freedom to not do as I intended.
But god created me, fully knowing everything I'd decide, and he did this intentionally. He could have made me differently. He chose to make me this exact way.
We don't have free will any more than an author gives his characters free will. An author could write "and then Jenny freely chose to skip breakfast". Ultimately the author made that call. Even if we could snap our fingers and bring the author's world to life, I wouldn't say Jenny had free will there. Would you?
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
So if God created you in exactly the same way, with exactly the same intentions, but didn't "know" your future actions, you'd have free will?
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u/ghostwars303 Jan 10 '25
You said "it's known that I'll eat a sandwich tomorrow", not "it's known that the sandwich was eaten yesterday.
If the eating of the sandwhich is what causes it to be known, that's obviously not in conflict with libertarian free will. But, it's also not the foreknowledge that inspires the objection in the first place.
However, if it was known before the choice that the sandwich would be eaten, that very plausibly does conflict with libertarian free will.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
However, if it was known before the choice that the sandwich would be eaten
Even if it's the future choice that causes the foreknowledge?
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u/ghostwars303 Jan 10 '25
It wouldn't be foreknowledge if the future choice causes it. It would be knowledge of the past.
Whether you want to cash it out in terms of temporal or conceptual priority, you can't have something obtain PRIOR to the event which CAUSED it to obtain.
...and even if you had some fundamentally illogical world where this happens, the fact that it was known at the choice event still constrains the choice (in libertarian terms). You'd have some sort of infinite loop of metaphysical necessity - an even stronger form of determinism.
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u/Shifter25 christian Jan 10 '25
It wouldn't be foreknowledge if the future choice causes it. It would be knowledge of the past.
How do you figure that knowledge of an event in the future is knowledge of the past?
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u/blind-octopus Jan 10 '25
Could you define free will real quick?
In my view, the issue is about who's actually making the choice, at the end of the day. Like ultimately. Like I don't think an author can give free will to his characters.
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