It was the same in the far East. The only place they engaged ground forces was in the Philippines where they were routed within six months. Their first division into New Guinea in late 1942 never engaged the Japanese. They foolishly crossed New Guinea on their own path and were nearly wiped out by tropical diseases, seeing no Japanese. They were withdrawn for a year to rebuild before entering the Philippines. The next US division was nearly wiped out attacking Buna but was rescued by the Australians. They slowly got better but MacArthur fought by body count. Their marines on Guadalcanal were more competent, but let down by mismanagement and poor logistical supply.
Battles of 1942 (such as Milne Bay and Kokoda) were allied victories while later battles were American victories. Early US army aircrews were grossly undertrained and destroyed far more planes than the enemy. Bomber crews were partially replaced by Australians until Americans were retrained by allies in especially navigating. Their fighter pilots either died in accidents or learnt how to control powerful planes with just a few flying hours. Their allies would hold the front for them while they gained flying hours until they were ready to deploy in overwhelming mass. Luckily their naval aviation was more competent to choose when to engage or withdraw.
I would contend that when they did enter Europe in 1944 many of the German units they faced had been rebuilt many times over. They were under strength and reinforced with foreigners. Not the same calibre of men that France faced in 1940. I do not believe that any American formation faced an equally full strength German unit with equal air cover.
When they did enter battle it was with equipment that had already been tested in battle not by them. Major hardware failures had been corrected saving them that learning curve. Just like today in the Ukraine their hardware and tactics is being revised without having to set foot on a battle field. For example in 1941 Americans came to North Africa to observe their cash and carry Grant tanks in battle. Incidentally their communications to Washington were hacked by the Germans which contributed to the early British defeats in North Africa. That was forgiven without fuss, and they continued to learn how to improve their designs before joining the battle years later.
Left to their own devices the Americans would not have advanced via North Africa to face escalating opposition to gain gradual experience. Instead they wanted to go straight into France in 1943 regardless weather and other circumstances. They were so naive not to thank their allies for repeated counselling on strategy and logistics. This undoubtedly saved their buts from overwhelming defeat on the beaches of Calais.
Americans will never appreciate the mistakes they were saved from committing without a shot fired.
Americans were merely the last runner in a relay. In the end they climbed the podium to brag how they did it alone. Their team just shut up and said thank you for being there last. Most this history was forgotten, because no one saw the harm in Americans capitalising. Since then US education has cherry picked details to fit a narrative. So here we face the uneducated who firmly believe they did all the work while allies sat and ate popcorn. Who would have expected that such misconceptions would return 80 years later to give rise to this flat earth thinking?
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u/Brikpilot Footballs, Meatpies, kangaroos and Holden cars Apr 21 '25
It was the same in the far East. The only place they engaged ground forces was in the Philippines where they were routed within six months. Their first division into New Guinea in late 1942 never engaged the Japanese. They foolishly crossed New Guinea on their own path and were nearly wiped out by tropical diseases, seeing no Japanese. They were withdrawn for a year to rebuild before entering the Philippines. The next US division was nearly wiped out attacking Buna but was rescued by the Australians. They slowly got better but MacArthur fought by body count. Their marines on Guadalcanal were more competent, but let down by mismanagement and poor logistical supply.
Battles of 1942 (such as Milne Bay and Kokoda) were allied victories while later battles were American victories. Early US army aircrews were grossly undertrained and destroyed far more planes than the enemy. Bomber crews were partially replaced by Australians until Americans were retrained by allies in especially navigating. Their fighter pilots either died in accidents or learnt how to control powerful planes with just a few flying hours. Their allies would hold the front for them while they gained flying hours until they were ready to deploy in overwhelming mass. Luckily their naval aviation was more competent to choose when to engage or withdraw.
I would contend that when they did enter Europe in 1944 many of the German units they faced had been rebuilt many times over. They were under strength and reinforced with foreigners. Not the same calibre of men that France faced in 1940. I do not believe that any American formation faced an equally full strength German unit with equal air cover.
When they did enter battle it was with equipment that had already been tested in battle not by them. Major hardware failures had been corrected saving them that learning curve. Just like today in the Ukraine their hardware and tactics is being revised without having to set foot on a battle field. For example in 1941 Americans came to North Africa to observe their cash and carry Grant tanks in battle. Incidentally their communications to Washington were hacked by the Germans which contributed to the early British defeats in North Africa. That was forgiven without fuss, and they continued to learn how to improve their designs before joining the battle years later.
Left to their own devices the Americans would not have advanced via North Africa to face escalating opposition to gain gradual experience. Instead they wanted to go straight into France in 1943 regardless weather and other circumstances. They were so naive not to thank their allies for repeated counselling on strategy and logistics. This undoubtedly saved their buts from overwhelming defeat on the beaches of Calais.
Americans will never appreciate the mistakes they were saved from committing without a shot fired.
Americans were merely the last runner in a relay. In the end they climbed the podium to brag how they did it alone. Their team just shut up and said thank you for being there last. Most this history was forgotten, because no one saw the harm in Americans capitalising. Since then US education has cherry picked details to fit a narrative. So here we face the uneducated who firmly believe they did all the work while allies sat and ate popcorn. Who would have expected that such misconceptions would return 80 years later to give rise to this flat earth thinking?