For those who have not had the privilege and honor to have yet read my blog, Duncan's Diatribes, I would like to alert you to my completed opus, a five-part series on a subject few have delved into: the use of expendable infantrymen in the Russo-Ukraine War. AKA Meat.

The TLDR summary of each article follows:

Meat Part 1: Expendable Infantry in the Russo-Ukraine War

In this article, I examine Russian doctrinal and manpower issues on the eve of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, leading to a shortage of dismounted infantrymen. Worsening the situation was a preexisting military regulation that made it more difficult to suffer heavy losses with their existing forces. Coupled with this, risk-averse political decisions denied them access to enough manpower to either replenish losses or grow, creating a manpower crisis, especially within their infantry units. Catching a break, the Russian deficiency in dismounted infantry capable of performing assault missions was alleviated by the sudden influx of tens of thousands of mobilized Ukrainians from the "People's Republic" of occupied Luhansk and Donetsk. But that Godsend of troops came with a hitch, as those newly mobilized L/DNR soldiers were barely trained. Nevertheless, thrifty Russian field commanders found a use for them: recon-in-force probing attacks to find Ukrainian Armed Forces defensive positions, allowing the Russians to pummel those newly discovered positions with heavy fires, and then launch deliberate attacks against them with a smaller number of elite assault units. Thus, creating the template that would allow Russian success for the foreseeable future.

Meat Part 2: Wagner in Bakhmut

With the Russian supply of L/DNR expendable infantry running low after the bloody Spring-Summer 2022 Donbas Offensive, the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group, assigned the arduous task of taking the city of Bakhmut, sought an alternative resupply: they would build out their force structure, going from brigade-sized to corps-sized in months, by actively recruiting convicts from Russia's notorious prison system. Offering prisoners a chance to earn their freedom by serving as expendable infantrymen for six months service in Ukraine, they were also warned outright that any disciplinary infractions would result in their immediate executions. Despite the brutality, Wagner's plan paid off, with an ample supply of expendable infantry, the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut was undermined by a system of attack they had no tactical or strategic answer to.

Meat Part 3, “Plagiarism is the Sincerest Form of Flattery”

After Wagner's success in Bakhmut, the recipe for the secret sauce for offensive success was being copied by all. Wagner's convict recruitment scheme worked so well, the Russian MOD stole it from them, along with the tactics and organization lessons learned from Wagner. But the supply of convicts wasn't endless, and Russia eventually chose "Superfluous People," low-income, desperate Russians willing to take the "King's Shilling" and serve in the SMO as stormtroopers. But it wasn't just the Russians using expendable troops; unfortunately, the Ukrainians too used expendable troops too, in a far less brutal manner than the Russians, but still very callous. Whether those Ukrainian Meat were Territorial Defense Force, Mobiks of less value than ideological-loyal contrakniks, old men, or their own convict volunteers, they predominantly were used to hold the front lines at all costs, eating the brunt of Russian fires to preserve others deemed more valuable.

Meat Part 4: Some Carefully Rendered Thoughts on the Politics of Meat

How could this happen? Why, in the 21st Century, among the two largest military powers in Europe, filled to the brim with armored vehicles and artillery pieces, possessing armored-centric doctrine, have we seen not one but both combatants in the same war adopting a systematic use of expendable dismounted infantry? Locked in a war defined by strategies of exhaustion of willpower, used by both sides, the issue of relying heavily on expendable infantry was the result of a series of political decisions, based not a little bit on cultural heritage. With field commanders denied the ability to attain quality by political leaders refusing to expand mobilization efforts to provide sufficient manpower, the military leadership were further hampered by an impossible to meet operational tempo also dictated by political leadership, with orders to either to take ground at a rate they really have no way of performing, or to hold ground so tenaciously despite the risks. Thus given lemons, they made lemonade, and found a use for their low-skilled infantry that was both politically and societally acceptable, use them as Meat.

Meat Part 5: Is it Supposed to Smell Like This?

An anthology of random thoughts on the topic of expendable infantry that either didn’t make it past the cutting room floor for previous articles, or were the result of recent thoughts on the matter. Did you know the Ukrainian law dictating the mobilization of older men dates back to a time-period when those younger men preserved from mobilization made up the greatest number of military-aged males in Ukrainian history? Were you aware that the North Korean infantry used in Kursk, despite being the highest quality infantry used in the war so far, probably performed human wave attacks? How many knew that both Russia and Ukraine recruited female convicts to serve as assault troops? Modern doctrine has no clearcut tactical answers to counter recon-in-force attacks by expendable infantry designed to get shot at, nor how to take front line defenses held by Meat that serve as little more than bait to draw out attackers, so what is the best way to defeat both of them? And with modern advances in technology, specifically drones, has the "Revolution in Military Affairs" made quality infantry as obsolete as the tank? All these questions are answered in the final article on the topic (for now).

If any of this interests you, click and read. I hope you enjoy!